You know what they say about the French, that they used to make the natives (bougnoules in French) in the countries they colonized learn French history by rote and declaim: “Our ancestors the Gauls…”? Well it is true. My father went to a government school in Beirut back in the late 1930’s, and he learned that his ancestors were Gauls. For someone who had just arrived from the South where he had only studied the Koran, that was a surprise! He kept the history book as proof.
Many years later, I went to a Francophone school in Beirut, and we did not learn to recite “our ancestors the Gauls”. We learned, however, much more about France than about Lebanon. Vercingetorix, king of the Gauls was our hero, because he resisted imperial Rome. We wept over Roland’s martyrdom in Roncevaux, when the Saracens (Sarazins, medieval French for bougnoules) killed him as he was defending Christendom. Popular French culture molded us and helped us find our role models. After reading Asterix’s stories, we saw Lebanon as the Gaul’s village: a small country of indomitable Phoenicians holding out against the Arab invaders.
The Asterix analogy persists to this day in the minds of many Lebanese. But they don’t see Lebanon as the village holding out against the Arabs anymore (many never did anyway), it is their sects that are besieged and holding out against …the other sects. Each sect has its own sets of heroes: for many Maronites, Samir Geagea is the reincarnation of Asterix the honorable freedom fighter, and Patriarch Sfeir is definitely the wise druid Getafix. For many Shi’a, both Asterix and Obelix fused into the persona of Hasan Nasrallah during the July 2006 war (that’s why he wears large flowing black robes), although after his press conference of March 20, Nabih Berri may soon be making claims to the title of the Shi’a Asterix.
France has really given us a lot: a country in the making since its making, cultural yardsticks truly rooted in our traditions, and the "tantes" of Ashrafieh. Its generosity knows no bounds. Seeing that the Sunnis lacked their own comic book hero, Chirac, the last of the Great Gauls, recently bestowed upon Saad Hariri the title of Chevalier de l’Ordre d’Asterix, for his heroic feats against the Syrian occupier. How better can you reward a cartoon character?
Chirac’s gesture was silly, and provided some light comic relief in the midst of all the tension (does Saad wear his decoration during the meetings with Berri?). But Chirac’s other attempts to “help Lebanon” (read: “his close friends and benefactors the Hariri family”) have not been as benign. I will pass over his stubborn support of one side versus the other in the war to end Lebanon, and the relentless efforts of the French ambassador Bernard Emié to block any compromise. But look at one of the outcomes of the post-war investigation in Israel, which was published by Haaretz a few days ago. Apparently, during the July war, Chirac formally requested from the Israelis to stop bombing Beirut (where there are a lot of French passport holders who can recite “our ancestors the Gauls”), and to bomb Syria instead. In other words to start a Syrian-Israeli war.
Chirac’s hatred of the Syrian regime is personal and deeply anchored in his belief that the Syrians killed Rafic Hariri. In true “justicier” tradition, he has sworn to Nazik that he will see that Bashar is punished. Whatever the price.
I would very much like to see the Assad dictatorial dynasty overthrown and replaced by a democracy representing the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people. But this cannot come at the price of turning Syria into another Iraq. One of the reasons is that this would really mean the end of both Syria and Lebanon, even (or especially) if the US gives its protection to Lebanon. Syria and Lebanon are too entangled and Lebanon too volatile for an Israeli attack against Syria not to have apocalyptic effects on Lebanon. If Chirac cannot see that, he should really stick to distributing ribbons.
For a few years now, there have been suspicions that Chirac may have been suffering from dementia. I think his latest achievements do not leave any doubt about that. Luckily, he is soon stepping down. Join me please in giving Mr. Chirac a big hand in a fond farewell. Better still, let’s honor him with the whole arm.
Abu Ali.
An Independent Source of Analysis on The Middle East
Thursday, March 22, 2007
Wednesday, March 14, 2007
The Roots of Inequality.
Lebanon’s cultural and environmental heritage is deeply rooted in its rural society. Our food traditions, our folklore and our landscape are kept alive by small family farmers. As rural people become impoverished and marginalized, they leave their lands, and our culture, society and environment erode. This has tremendous implications: poverty creates despair, which is conducive to political violence. The dissolution of the ties between people and land creates nations of passers-by, countries with employees but without citizen. This is a great part of Lebanon’s problem.
If it’s any consolation, all countries of the Mediterranean basin (and most countries of the world) have experienced the same deruralization phenomenon, coupled with the fragmentation of farm property and the decline of rural society. Countries of the North Mediterranean (Spain, France, Italy…) have developed and implemented policies to deal with the problem, with a certain measure of success. Countries of the South Mediterranean are still struggling with the issue, and their situation appears to be desperate. They have been unable to reduce the number of the rural poor in spite of the adoption of policies that favor agriculture. Why?
Analysts have studied the causes underlying the breakdown of small holder family farming and the resulting impoverishment and migration in many developing nations (see International Commission of the Future of Food and Agriculture). There is general agreement that these can be attributed to a set of interdependent national and international issues. Prominent among them are: poor governmental support services to agriculture, especially to the small holder; insecure land tenure; and the adoption of the neo-liberal economic policies package built around free trade and market fundamentalism. All of these apply unquestionably to Lebanon.
Trade-based agriculture, based on “comparative advantage” and “export-oriented agriculture”, has been Lebanon’s approach to food way before the IMF adopted the approach as part of its structural adjustment package. The founding fathers (mostly bankers and merchants) saw Lebanon as a big trading agency. They fought in parliament for minimal taxation on imports of food and other products, in order to increase the volume of trade and their own profits. Although they looked down at rural people, they were not opposed to farming per se: they invested in silk production, which required the planting of large areas of mulberry trees to replace the traditional food systems. They imported wheat and other foods and sold them to the farmers. And when the “allied” blockade was imposed on Beirut during WWI, and trade routes were cut, tens of thousands of rural poor died from famine and malnutrition because, unlike silk worms, they could not eat mulberry leaves. This caused a massive wave of migration and immigration which heralded the new urban Lebanon. Eventually, the silk trade died, and so did the mountain. Sometime in the 1950’s apple orchards started replacing mulberries as a crop for export to the emerging oil economies. This was successful in the 1960’s and 70’s, until global trade intensified. Today, Lebanese apple growers compete with US apple producers on the Lebanese market!
One would think that food export would be a good way to even out the hopelessly ailing import-export balance of Lebanon, and to inject hard currency into the country. This is only partly true. While the potential impact of food exports on the balance is likely to remain small (the gap is several orders of magnitude wide), there are many disastrous drawbacks to an agricultural strategy based on export. Producing efficiently for export requires a critical mass of assets including land, capital and knowledge that is beyond the vast majority of the small landholders, family farmers. Large-scale, export-oriented agricultural production is built on monocultures, which cause tremendous environmental damage due to the abuse of agrochemicals and to their impact on biodiversity. It is also a major cause of social dislocation, as poor rural people are driven out of farming to become underpaid farm workers who do not benefit from any form of social security, and to whom labor laws do not apply. It favors large, dehumanized agribusinesses at the expense of small farming communities. Export-oriented farming is good for business, but only that of a few people.
Intrinsic to the concept of export-oriented production is the notion of “comparative advantage”. This is something we love to brag about in Lebanon, without really capturing the implications. Due to a combination of environmental, technical and economic reasons, some countries can produce food commodities more competitively than others. The country in question is then encouraged to produce more of this specific commodity for export, while importing basic food commodities produced elsewhere. Syria has standards of living and incomes that are lower than Lebanon. It has mountains, plains, water, cheap labor and state subsidies for agriculture. It is mostly a rural nation. Syria therefore has serious comparative advantages over Lebanon. In principle, we should not complain about the “dumping” of food products from Syria, because we practice a liberal trade policy. Cheap imports from Syria (or Jordan) reduce the cost of food, which is, in theory, good for the consumer. In fact, it turns out that Syria is not one of our major food import partners. It is however one of our main food export partners (we export to and through Syria). Our 3 main food import partners are: The US, France and Germany (FAO data, country profiles). They are the countries that have the most comparative advantage over us. They sell us most of the food we eat.
Farmers in industrialized countries such as our major import partners acquire their comparative advantage through state subsidies. The EU and the US agricultural subsidies are widely recognized as the biggest source of distortion to the world food trade; resulting in the catastrophic collapse of smallholder farming in developing countries (Oxfam has a long standing campaign on the issue). For example, in 2005, the EU paid €300m a year to tomato processors mainly in Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal, representing 65% of the value of the entire crop. This enabled them to be the world’s leading exporters of tomato paste. The EU also subsidized its fruit-juice processing industry, mainly in Italy and Spain, at a rate of more than 300%, or €250m a year. Growers from Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica and South Africa could have earned $40m a year more if the EU removed its subsidies and the world juice price rose by just 5% (Oxfam data).
Yet, both governmental policies (when they exist) and international aid to developing countries, including aid to Lebanon, continue to base their projects on the production of commodities for export based on “comparative advantage”, while promoting imports from the industrialized countries. Recently, the Lebanese agricultural private sector (represented by the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, to which most small farmers do not have access), together with the Ministry of Agriculture agreed on a six points program to revive agriculture. Each one of these points is about improving exports, with not a single mention of the small holder family farmer. Needless to say, the large agribusiness operators are thrilled!
Civil society activists in the Industrialized North are constantly lobbying for a fairer trade environment for the developing nations. The final declaration of the Euromed Civil Forum in 2006, included a strong call to give the Mediterranean Partner Countries (Lebanon included) the right to protect their food security, instead of insisting on “reciprocity” in on-going and future trade negotiations. Meanwhile, we in the developing nations enter into “reciprocal” trade agreements that cannot be advantageous to us. Take the European Partnership Agreement, which Lebanon signed 5 years ago. The agreement opens up our markets after a grace period of 5 years to food products from the EU, with taxes not exceeding 5%, while the EU opens its markets as soon as the agreement is signed (reciprocity). With a small proviso: Lebanese products have to abide by EU quality standards and to work around Brussels’s bureaucracy. No small producer can satisfy these requirements! But wait, there is worse: the EU is not one of our main food export partner, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf are. The EU is however our second most important food import partner! So we have agreed to open our markets to countries from which we already import food by the billions. In return, they have agreed to open their markets to us, a country that does not, and will not easily, export to them. That is a sweetheart deal! No wonder they gave us 10 million Euros to “improve the sector” in partnership with the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture! They’ll get their money back in one week, and the large Lebanese agribusiness companies will be able to increase their wealth. Meanwhile, the small holder farmers will continue to get poorer because these policies do not target them directly and effectively.
Herein lies the great paradox of agriculture, farming and rural society: support to agriculture as an economic sector via market-fundamentalist policies, without distinguishing between poor and rich can increase the returns from the sector, but it will creates more inequalities. As a matter of fact, research (by the World Bank!) has shown that in countries where land is distributed unequally (as in Lebanon), policies to increase agricultural income can cause more inequality in income distribution, if the poor are not adequately targeted (Adams, 1999). This is attributed to the fact that inadequate land distribution pushes the poor out of the agricultural sector and into the non-farm sector, and leaves the rich to benefit from sectoral support. Indeed, the beneficiaries of such policies are often big landowners producing crops aimed at mass marketing and for export. They are those who have most benefited from IDAL’s Export-Plus program and the Kafalat government supported loan programs. In Lebanon, we use the taxes from the poor to subsidize the rich. No wonder the poor are upset!
Abu Ali.
If it’s any consolation, all countries of the Mediterranean basin (and most countries of the world) have experienced the same deruralization phenomenon, coupled with the fragmentation of farm property and the decline of rural society. Countries of the North Mediterranean (Spain, France, Italy…) have developed and implemented policies to deal with the problem, with a certain measure of success. Countries of the South Mediterranean are still struggling with the issue, and their situation appears to be desperate. They have been unable to reduce the number of the rural poor in spite of the adoption of policies that favor agriculture. Why?
Analysts have studied the causes underlying the breakdown of small holder family farming and the resulting impoverishment and migration in many developing nations (see International Commission of the Future of Food and Agriculture). There is general agreement that these can be attributed to a set of interdependent national and international issues. Prominent among them are: poor governmental support services to agriculture, especially to the small holder; insecure land tenure; and the adoption of the neo-liberal economic policies package built around free trade and market fundamentalism. All of these apply unquestionably to Lebanon.
Trade-based agriculture, based on “comparative advantage” and “export-oriented agriculture”, has been Lebanon’s approach to food way before the IMF adopted the approach as part of its structural adjustment package. The founding fathers (mostly bankers and merchants) saw Lebanon as a big trading agency. They fought in parliament for minimal taxation on imports of food and other products, in order to increase the volume of trade and their own profits. Although they looked down at rural people, they were not opposed to farming per se: they invested in silk production, which required the planting of large areas of mulberry trees to replace the traditional food systems. They imported wheat and other foods and sold them to the farmers. And when the “allied” blockade was imposed on Beirut during WWI, and trade routes were cut, tens of thousands of rural poor died from famine and malnutrition because, unlike silk worms, they could not eat mulberry leaves. This caused a massive wave of migration and immigration which heralded the new urban Lebanon. Eventually, the silk trade died, and so did the mountain. Sometime in the 1950’s apple orchards started replacing mulberries as a crop for export to the emerging oil economies. This was successful in the 1960’s and 70’s, until global trade intensified. Today, Lebanese apple growers compete with US apple producers on the Lebanese market!
One would think that food export would be a good way to even out the hopelessly ailing import-export balance of Lebanon, and to inject hard currency into the country. This is only partly true. While the potential impact of food exports on the balance is likely to remain small (the gap is several orders of magnitude wide), there are many disastrous drawbacks to an agricultural strategy based on export. Producing efficiently for export requires a critical mass of assets including land, capital and knowledge that is beyond the vast majority of the small landholders, family farmers. Large-scale, export-oriented agricultural production is built on monocultures, which cause tremendous environmental damage due to the abuse of agrochemicals and to their impact on biodiversity. It is also a major cause of social dislocation, as poor rural people are driven out of farming to become underpaid farm workers who do not benefit from any form of social security, and to whom labor laws do not apply. It favors large, dehumanized agribusinesses at the expense of small farming communities. Export-oriented farming is good for business, but only that of a few people.
Intrinsic to the concept of export-oriented production is the notion of “comparative advantage”. This is something we love to brag about in Lebanon, without really capturing the implications. Due to a combination of environmental, technical and economic reasons, some countries can produce food commodities more competitively than others. The country in question is then encouraged to produce more of this specific commodity for export, while importing basic food commodities produced elsewhere. Syria has standards of living and incomes that are lower than Lebanon. It has mountains, plains, water, cheap labor and state subsidies for agriculture. It is mostly a rural nation. Syria therefore has serious comparative advantages over Lebanon. In principle, we should not complain about the “dumping” of food products from Syria, because we practice a liberal trade policy. Cheap imports from Syria (or Jordan) reduce the cost of food, which is, in theory, good for the consumer. In fact, it turns out that Syria is not one of our major food import partners. It is however one of our main food export partners (we export to and through Syria). Our 3 main food import partners are: The US, France and Germany (FAO data, country profiles). They are the countries that have the most comparative advantage over us. They sell us most of the food we eat.
Farmers in industrialized countries such as our major import partners acquire their comparative advantage through state subsidies. The EU and the US agricultural subsidies are widely recognized as the biggest source of distortion to the world food trade; resulting in the catastrophic collapse of smallholder farming in developing countries (Oxfam has a long standing campaign on the issue). For example, in 2005, the EU paid €300m a year to tomato processors mainly in Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal, representing 65% of the value of the entire crop. This enabled them to be the world’s leading exporters of tomato paste. The EU also subsidized its fruit-juice processing industry, mainly in Italy and Spain, at a rate of more than 300%, or €250m a year. Growers from Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica and South Africa could have earned $40m a year more if the EU removed its subsidies and the world juice price rose by just 5% (Oxfam data).
Yet, both governmental policies (when they exist) and international aid to developing countries, including aid to Lebanon, continue to base their projects on the production of commodities for export based on “comparative advantage”, while promoting imports from the industrialized countries. Recently, the Lebanese agricultural private sector (represented by the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, to which most small farmers do not have access), together with the Ministry of Agriculture agreed on a six points program to revive agriculture. Each one of these points is about improving exports, with not a single mention of the small holder family farmer. Needless to say, the large agribusiness operators are thrilled!
Civil society activists in the Industrialized North are constantly lobbying for a fairer trade environment for the developing nations. The final declaration of the Euromed Civil Forum in 2006, included a strong call to give the Mediterranean Partner Countries (Lebanon included) the right to protect their food security, instead of insisting on “reciprocity” in on-going and future trade negotiations. Meanwhile, we in the developing nations enter into “reciprocal” trade agreements that cannot be advantageous to us. Take the European Partnership Agreement, which Lebanon signed 5 years ago. The agreement opens up our markets after a grace period of 5 years to food products from the EU, with taxes not exceeding 5%, while the EU opens its markets as soon as the agreement is signed (reciprocity). With a small proviso: Lebanese products have to abide by EU quality standards and to work around Brussels’s bureaucracy. No small producer can satisfy these requirements! But wait, there is worse: the EU is not one of our main food export partner, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf are. The EU is however our second most important food import partner! So we have agreed to open our markets to countries from which we already import food by the billions. In return, they have agreed to open their markets to us, a country that does not, and will not easily, export to them. That is a sweetheart deal! No wonder they gave us 10 million Euros to “improve the sector” in partnership with the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture! They’ll get their money back in one week, and the large Lebanese agribusiness companies will be able to increase their wealth. Meanwhile, the small holder farmers will continue to get poorer because these policies do not target them directly and effectively.
Herein lies the great paradox of agriculture, farming and rural society: support to agriculture as an economic sector via market-fundamentalist policies, without distinguishing between poor and rich can increase the returns from the sector, but it will creates more inequalities. As a matter of fact, research (by the World Bank!) has shown that in countries where land is distributed unequally (as in Lebanon), policies to increase agricultural income can cause more inequality in income distribution, if the poor are not adequately targeted (Adams, 1999). This is attributed to the fact that inadequate land distribution pushes the poor out of the agricultural sector and into the non-farm sector, and leaves the rich to benefit from sectoral support. Indeed, the beneficiaries of such policies are often big landowners producing crops aimed at mass marketing and for export. They are those who have most benefited from IDAL’s Export-Plus program and the Kafalat government supported loan programs. In Lebanon, we use the taxes from the poor to subsidize the rich. No wonder the poor are upset!
Abu Ali.
Sunday, March 11, 2007
Chatham House's response to Sy Hersh's article
Thank you for highlighting Michael Young's piece on Seymour Hersh. It isindeed intriguing that Hersh should make such allegations about Lebanon.I was in Beirut last weekend and this was causing quite a stir. The article seems to imply that Saudi Arabia and the US are grooming Al-Qaedato fight Hizballah in Lebanon. One explanation being touted is that theremay be one thing worse than having the US as your enemy, and that is to have the US as your friend.
This makes you the target of anybody with anaxe to grind with the Bush administration.One result of the war in Lebanon last summer is that it has created aninextricable link between all the conflicts in the region. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Iranhave become part of a single confrontation where you cannot resolve oneissue without addressing all the others. If what Hersh is saying is true, then this has implications not only for Lebanon but also for Iraq and thefuture of the Gulf region.
Michael is quite right in questioning the details and facts on which thearticle is based. I met one of Hersh's sources, which he describes as a 'senior Lebanese official' and quotes as saying that 'we have a liberalattitude that allows Al Qaeda types to have a presence here'. In the context of the article this sounds like the 'senior official' is tolerating or advocating the presence of Al Qaeda. What he explained tome is that he told Hersh that Lebanon has a Liberal system which allowspolitical expression and where security services do not have the control it takes to prevent such groups coming in from neighbouring countries.Fateh al Islam, which is mentioned by Hersh, is a splinter group of theFateh al Intifada, sponsored by Syria since the 1980's to fight the mainstream Fateh of Yasser Arafat with the aim of controlling thePalestinian card.
The question is whether such a group is, as the articleimplies, a Hariri/Saudi sponsored terrorist organisation to fightHizballah, or is it the same organization under another name with the same sponsors? In other words, is the government the culprit here or is it thevictim? and if so does the article try to reverse the image?In the end of the day, it all boils down to the use of Palestinian camps, which have been no go areas for the Lebanese legal authorities since theearly 70s, as pockets that are outside the law which can be infiltrated.
The government of PM Siniora has recently engaged, for the first time, in a programme of camp improvement and rehabilitation aimed at amelioratingthe living conditions of the refugees. This will make them lessvulnerable to recruitment by such groups and outside influences. I will of course continue to enjoy reading Hersh's articles, but I am sure he would appreciate that more precision is needed where the implicationsare so grave.
Nadim Shehadi
Chatham House, London
This makes you the target of anybody with anaxe to grind with the Bush administration.One result of the war in Lebanon last summer is that it has created aninextricable link between all the conflicts in the region. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Iranhave become part of a single confrontation where you cannot resolve oneissue without addressing all the others. If what Hersh is saying is true, then this has implications not only for Lebanon but also for Iraq and thefuture of the Gulf region.
Michael is quite right in questioning the details and facts on which thearticle is based. I met one of Hersh's sources, which he describes as a 'senior Lebanese official' and quotes as saying that 'we have a liberalattitude that allows Al Qaeda types to have a presence here'. In the context of the article this sounds like the 'senior official' is tolerating or advocating the presence of Al Qaeda. What he explained tome is that he told Hersh that Lebanon has a Liberal system which allowspolitical expression and where security services do not have the control it takes to prevent such groups coming in from neighbouring countries.Fateh al Islam, which is mentioned by Hersh, is a splinter group of theFateh al Intifada, sponsored by Syria since the 1980's to fight the mainstream Fateh of Yasser Arafat with the aim of controlling thePalestinian card.
The question is whether such a group is, as the articleimplies, a Hariri/Saudi sponsored terrorist organisation to fightHizballah, or is it the same organization under another name with the same sponsors? In other words, is the government the culprit here or is it thevictim? and if so does the article try to reverse the image?In the end of the day, it all boils down to the use of Palestinian camps, which have been no go areas for the Lebanese legal authorities since theearly 70s, as pockets that are outside the law which can be infiltrated.
The government of PM Siniora has recently engaged, for the first time, in a programme of camp improvement and rehabilitation aimed at amelioratingthe living conditions of the refugees. This will make them lessvulnerable to recruitment by such groups and outside influences. I will of course continue to enjoy reading Hersh's articles, but I am sure he would appreciate that more precision is needed where the implicationsare so grave.
Nadim Shehadi
Chatham House, London
Friday, March 09, 2007
Celebrating International Women’s Day
My staunchly feminist friend (the same one who inadvertently pushed me to write my post on the Shi’a, “Getting to know each other”) sent me a text message a couple of days ago. It said: “I’m at AUH (the American University Hospital). Haven’t been there in a while. I can’t believe how much the number of veiled women has increased. You should really do something about that”. I replied: “Weird. My cousin just messaged me from AUH to complain that the number of unveiled women has increased. She said I should do something about it”. She replied: “It’s terrible. You should really do something, like liberate them”.
My cousins are veiled and live in the South. We never touch or shake hands. When we meet, they place their hands on their chest and do a little curtsy. I make fun of them and run after them and hold them so they never get to go to paradise. We’re quite close, we talk about everything, politics, family, friends, loves. During the war, they stayed in the village and drove their cars at night to take food to the fighters in the hills. They also took turns guarding the village at night. When the war ended, they buried their dead, rebuilt their houses and sent their kids to school. How can I possibly liberate them? When I’m around them I feel I’m the one who needs liberating.
When I try to talk to them seriously about their veil or about the no-handshake rule, they tell me to lay off. They say that they don’t talk about my unveiled wife, our other unveiled relatives in the village or about my clothes, so why should I talk about theirs? They tell me that people have different habits depending on where they live, and that in the US, men don’t greet each others by kissing, as we do in Lebanon, so they don’t have to greet by shaking hands if they don’t want to. They call me prejudiced. They may be right.
But it’s not like that everywhere. I got into a heated argument with a group of people in a village of the deep South. I was there helping local women initiate an artisanal laurel oil soap making facility to improve their livelihoods. They were telling me about their village and singing its praises. One of them bragged that their village is special because, unlike other Shi’a villages, there are no unveiled women at all. If a women decides to unveil, her parents put pressure on her, and failing that, the Sheikh pays her a visit and convinces her. Either the veil or ostracism. I blew a fuse and argued loudly about individual freedoms and basic human rights. Some of the women eventually came round and admitted that this was too much. The men stuck to their positions.
My friend (the feminist veiled-women liberator) lives in a posh part of town. She has a high powered job, two young children and two maids. One is Philippina and the other is Sri-Lankan. She says they’re easier to control when they’re not from the same nationality. It is also cheaper. Sri-Lankans go for about half the price of the Philippinas, who speak English better. But that’s fine because only the Philippina, who takes direct care of the children, needs to speak English. The other does the house chores and speaks a pidgin Arabic-English mix sufficient to understand orders and execute them.
She treats them real nice, she says. They get half a day off per week, during which they go to church. She always pays them on time, and sometimes she takes them out with her, when the kids are invited and there are other maids they can mingle with. They also go with her to the supermarket and she always buys them a treat: a magazine, some chocolate. This is much better than their life in their country, and if they were not happy, she says, they would leave. She keeps their passports, just in case.
It’s International Women’s Day. There are Unesco-sponsored lectures at academic institutions. On Saturday March 10, there is a special exhibition and a party with music and art shows from afternoon till dawn. Entrance is free, but I’m not sure there will be many Philippina, Sri-Lankan or Ethiopian maids celebrating alongside the Lebanese women. Their day off is Sunday.
Abu Ali.
My cousins are veiled and live in the South. We never touch or shake hands. When we meet, they place their hands on their chest and do a little curtsy. I make fun of them and run after them and hold them so they never get to go to paradise. We’re quite close, we talk about everything, politics, family, friends, loves. During the war, they stayed in the village and drove their cars at night to take food to the fighters in the hills. They also took turns guarding the village at night. When the war ended, they buried their dead, rebuilt their houses and sent their kids to school. How can I possibly liberate them? When I’m around them I feel I’m the one who needs liberating.
When I try to talk to them seriously about their veil or about the no-handshake rule, they tell me to lay off. They say that they don’t talk about my unveiled wife, our other unveiled relatives in the village or about my clothes, so why should I talk about theirs? They tell me that people have different habits depending on where they live, and that in the US, men don’t greet each others by kissing, as we do in Lebanon, so they don’t have to greet by shaking hands if they don’t want to. They call me prejudiced. They may be right.
But it’s not like that everywhere. I got into a heated argument with a group of people in a village of the deep South. I was there helping local women initiate an artisanal laurel oil soap making facility to improve their livelihoods. They were telling me about their village and singing its praises. One of them bragged that their village is special because, unlike other Shi’a villages, there are no unveiled women at all. If a women decides to unveil, her parents put pressure on her, and failing that, the Sheikh pays her a visit and convinces her. Either the veil or ostracism. I blew a fuse and argued loudly about individual freedoms and basic human rights. Some of the women eventually came round and admitted that this was too much. The men stuck to their positions.
My friend (the feminist veiled-women liberator) lives in a posh part of town. She has a high powered job, two young children and two maids. One is Philippina and the other is Sri-Lankan. She says they’re easier to control when they’re not from the same nationality. It is also cheaper. Sri-Lankans go for about half the price of the Philippinas, who speak English better. But that’s fine because only the Philippina, who takes direct care of the children, needs to speak English. The other does the house chores and speaks a pidgin Arabic-English mix sufficient to understand orders and execute them.
She treats them real nice, she says. They get half a day off per week, during which they go to church. She always pays them on time, and sometimes she takes them out with her, when the kids are invited and there are other maids they can mingle with. They also go with her to the supermarket and she always buys them a treat: a magazine, some chocolate. This is much better than their life in their country, and if they were not happy, she says, they would leave. She keeps their passports, just in case.
It’s International Women’s Day. There are Unesco-sponsored lectures at academic institutions. On Saturday March 10, there is a special exhibition and a party with music and art shows from afternoon till dawn. Entrance is free, but I’m not sure there will be many Philippina, Sri-Lankan or Ethiopian maids celebrating alongside the Lebanese women. Their day off is Sunday.
Abu Ali.
Wednesday, March 07, 2007
Lebanon Version 2.0
The time has come to congratulate the Lebanese for creating the most polarized and dysfunctional country in the world. Here we are, roughly divided into two groups busy demonizing each other. and going out of our way to reject any validity in our opponents’ views. Each side asserts some kind of monopoly to what being Lebanese really represents, and holds massive demonstrations waving the same flag, but agreeing on little else. It is ironic that each claims to be highly patriotic while depending on foreign support whether in the form of "protection" or "domination", the argument becoming one of semantics with the end-result being the same. Of course, as Lebanese we have excuses which include a litany of grievances. Our first basic problem has to do with our history: it is the most exclusionary narrative you can think of, as it is only relevant to about a quarter of the population. Furthermore, history books go out of their way to alienate the rest of the country.
The concept of Lebanon was created by the Maronite church in the mid-XIXth century. At the time, some of the ruling Shihab emirs had converted to Christianity and the church saw an opportunity to unify Mount Lebanon under its own banner. As soon as Bachir II fell and was sent into exile in 1840, Patriarch Hubaysh started clamoring for his return and for the establishment of a Maronite Imara in the mountains. He sent Abbot Nicolas Murad to Constantinople to lobby for the cause, but to no avail. The French, on the other hand, were more receptive. Abbot Murad wrote a short pamphlet in 1844: "Notice Historique sur l'Origine de la Nation Maronite", in which he explained that the "Lebanese" were in fact some type of misplaced Europeans who had had a continuous relationship with France since at least the time of St.Louis and the Crusades.
French direct involvement in the country only helped to reinforce the idea. It should be remembered that the second half of the XIXth century in Europe saw the birth of numerous national movements. There was no reason that one should not start in Mount Lebanon. With the development of archeology, our "Phoenician ancestors" joined the fray to add some much-needed gravitas to the proceedings. If the French had their Gaulois forbearers, there was no reason why the Lebanese should not also have their own. The concept of Lebanon was basically a French-Maronite dream (an outstanding analysis of the period can be found in Carol Hakim-Dowek’s thesis: "The Origins of the Lebanese National Idea"). Eventually, Greater Lebanon was created in 1920 incorporating the cities of the coast as well as the Bekaa, Akkar and 'Amil. The idea being that the late additions to the fledging country should be more than eager to adopt the historical narrative of central Mount Lebanon although it was totally alien to them.
To summarize the Lebanist view of history: overwhelmed by the onslaught of the Arab/Islamic hordes, the descendants of the ancient Phoenicians had to take refuge in the Lebanese mountain where they bravely resisted against all types of aggression and stayed in close contact with the West. They were biding their time, and when the corrupt Ottoman Empire finally collapsed, France was there to liberate them and to help them fulfill their manifest destiny. The Invisible City of Beirut then emerged from the mist as the prize the courageous Lebanese had so richly deserved. Now they were going to show the world what they were capable of. A lucky few peripheral areas were added to the new state, and they were expected to count their blessings and immediately follow the lead of their new brethrens. But at no time should they ever forget that the heart of Lebanon was beating in Bkerke.
The story is very compelling, and it is the one most of us learn in our schoolbooks. The problem is that it was totally irrelevant to the majority of the population of (Greater) Lebanon. In 1920, with the army of emir Faysal at the border, another historical narrative was emerging: one that places Lebanon firmly in the region, known as Arabism. Arabists tended to be concentrated on the coast. They did not see fundamental differences between the inhabitants of the mountain and the rest of the denizens of the Near East. They did not understand the Lebanist visceral attachment to the new colonial power, preferring to have close relationships with other Arab states. In time they would find a sacred cause: the Palestinian Revolution.
The history of modern Lebanon is one of conflicts and alliances between the Lebanists and the Arabists. Whenever they agreed to stop fighting, the birth, re-birth, and third coming of the country were announced: in 1943 with the National Pact, in 1989 with the Taef Agreement and on March 14 2005, with a massive demonstration. When they disagreed, internal strife quickly followed. Common wisdom dictated that for the country to be viable, both camps should join forces. Again, this is undoubtedly a very interesting story, but one with a huge problem: it just does not make sense as it ignores a wide number of Lebanese realities. And of course, it is also a very exclusionary narrative.
The problem with the Lebanist view is that it completely ignores not only the fragmentation of the country, but also the internal divisions of Mount Lebanon. Even at the most basic Maronite level, the area is divided in three separate zones who historically had fundamentally different experiences: the north was mostly ruled by clans, the center had a feudal structure with continuous tensions between the different social classes, while the south was dominated by non-Christian sects. When the Lebanese state collapsed in 1975, the three zones spent the next 15 years slaughtering each other: Ahrar (south) versus Kataeb (center), Kataeb (center) versus Marada (north), Hobeika (center) versus Geagea (north), Geagea (north) versus Aoun (center)... All the while Bkerke was bemoaning the "Christians" lack of unity.
For all intents of purpose, Arabism became obsolete in June of 1967 after the Egyptian strongman Jamal Abdel Nasser was humiliated by the Israelis. The whole ideology became an excuse for local dictators to persecute their population. Lebanese Arabists became pretty desperate, and had to up the ante in order to stay relevant so they basically agreed to give the country away to the "Palestinian Revolution". Eventually, given the catastrophic results of the strategy, a majority of Arabists would turn to a much more convenient champion, the Saudi petro-dollar, leaving behind a handful of disgruntled leftists.
Another problem has always been the lack of trust between Lebanists and Arabists. The former always claimed that if you were to scratch the patriotic veneer of the latter, their true colors would show. As a friend told me after March 14 2005: “these people have rediscovered Lebanon, but it will take more than a couple of months of waving the flag to convince us of their sincerity”. Over time, many formulas had been devised to solve the problem: neither East nor West, a bridge between the East and the West, a country with an Arab face...The journalist Georges Naccache summarized the problem in 1949 by stating that: “deux negations ne font pas une nation!”.
The Lebanist versus Arabist view does not even come close to explaining Lebanon's present problem as it only concerns about half of our population. The other half is completely missing from the story. A number of important events are either omitted or downplayed in our official Lebanese history, one of them being the violent popular uprisings of central Mount Lebanon in the first half of the XIXth century, known as 'Ammiyyat. These populists movements aimed to topple the traditional leadership of the area and to replace it by a new one issued from the masses. Michel Aoun and his Tayyar are the rightful heirs to the old revolts. Ascribing his movement to the blind presidential ambition of one man completely misses the point, and whether or not Lebanon will end up with a South American type of dictatorship is irrelevant. The fact is, that there is a large swath of the population that is ignored by our traditional chieftains, and with good reason since it is trying to have them replaced. It might seem shocking, but some individuals have a hard time accepting a pseudo-feudal leadership that is passed from incompetent father to usually even more incompetent son.
The Lebanist/Arabist narrative also totally ignores the fringes of the country. In all fairness, Akkar gets a couple of sentences in our official history: the "Lebanese" emir Fakhreddin went there to defeat Bani Sayfa, and took away the black stones of their houses to build his palace in Deir el Kamar. Hermel, the Bekaa and Jabal 'Amel are not so lucky. One would be hard-pressed to find any mention of them in the history of Lebanon: they are treated as non-entities. For the longest time it was not a problem as local traditional leaders such as Sabri Hamadeh and Kamel el Assaad were doing an excellent job controlling the locals. Things started to change in the early 70's under the impulse of Imam Musa el Sadr.
Having lived most of his life in Iran where the Shi'a are the dominant group, Musa el Sadr did not have any inferiority complex when it came to demanding more for his community from the Lebanese state. From now on, the Matlabiyya would not be presented piecemeal by the usual feudal chieftains, but much more vigorously by a well structured movement that did not reject the idea of Lebanon but was demanding its fair share of the national pie. This did not sit well with either the Arabists who had just given 'Amil to the Palestinians so they could turn it into Fatah Land, or with the gutless Lebanists who had approved the move for they did not realize that there were people actually living at the periphery of the country. As far as the two dominant groups were concerned, Imam Musa el Sadr was an Iranian agent sent by the Shah and financed by the Savak to destabilize the country. Either way, the genie was out of the bottle and it had no intention of going back in.
After the murder of Mr. Rafic Hariri, the Lebanists and the Arabists decided to give the old formula another try, so their traditional leaders formed the March 14 gathering. Except that this time, they were completely taken by surprise: the part of the population they had ignored for decades refused to play along, aggressively stating that the old arrangement would not be accepted this time around. In all fairness, both Lebanism and Arabism are grossly outdated at this point, and for Lebanon to survive a new formula that takes the whole population into account is needed. Instead, what we have today is one camp still busy ignoring the existence of half the population as if we are still in 1943, while the other is clumsily knocking at the door trying to fit in what is after all also their country. As for the political discourse, it is reaching surreal proportions with each faction accusing the foreign patrons of the other of wanting to destroy the country.
Some people will argue that history is irrelevant, that it is just a lame excuse used by those not patriotic enough, who refuse to adapt to the widely accepted paradigm. But in order to believe in Lebanon, you have to be part of it. Currently we have two well-defined camps who accuse one another of not being Lebanese enough. They are both wrong as no single movement has a monopoly on what being Lebanese really represents. In the end, we are all bound together in our country and we have no other choice than to try to understand each other. This requires efforts to open up and respect the other side's point of view, and to come up with a hundred reasons why March 14 should reach out to March 8 (and vice versa), instead of a hundred reasons why one is better than the other. What is also needed is the realization that the Old Lebanon that was an unstable compromise between Lebanists and Arabists died a long time ago. A new dynamic needs to start immediately if we still want to have a country. An essential first step is a historical narrative that is inclusive, as opposed to the shamefully exclusive one that we currently have. We don't need a new history of Lebanon, what we need is a history of the Lebanese People, all of them, from Bint Jbail to 'Andket, with arguments on the historical fine points to come later. Claiming that we are fighting for 10,452 km2, while imposing the history of only 3,500 km2 on the rest of the country, reeks of cultural colonialism.
Mustapha Mond.
The concept of Lebanon was created by the Maronite church in the mid-XIXth century. At the time, some of the ruling Shihab emirs had converted to Christianity and the church saw an opportunity to unify Mount Lebanon under its own banner. As soon as Bachir II fell and was sent into exile in 1840, Patriarch Hubaysh started clamoring for his return and for the establishment of a Maronite Imara in the mountains. He sent Abbot Nicolas Murad to Constantinople to lobby for the cause, but to no avail. The French, on the other hand, were more receptive. Abbot Murad wrote a short pamphlet in 1844: "Notice Historique sur l'Origine de la Nation Maronite", in which he explained that the "Lebanese" were in fact some type of misplaced Europeans who had had a continuous relationship with France since at least the time of St.Louis and the Crusades.
French direct involvement in the country only helped to reinforce the idea. It should be remembered that the second half of the XIXth century in Europe saw the birth of numerous national movements. There was no reason that one should not start in Mount Lebanon. With the development of archeology, our "Phoenician ancestors" joined the fray to add some much-needed gravitas to the proceedings. If the French had their Gaulois forbearers, there was no reason why the Lebanese should not also have their own. The concept of Lebanon was basically a French-Maronite dream (an outstanding analysis of the period can be found in Carol Hakim-Dowek’s thesis: "The Origins of the Lebanese National Idea"). Eventually, Greater Lebanon was created in 1920 incorporating the cities of the coast as well as the Bekaa, Akkar and 'Amil. The idea being that the late additions to the fledging country should be more than eager to adopt the historical narrative of central Mount Lebanon although it was totally alien to them.
To summarize the Lebanist view of history: overwhelmed by the onslaught of the Arab/Islamic hordes, the descendants of the ancient Phoenicians had to take refuge in the Lebanese mountain where they bravely resisted against all types of aggression and stayed in close contact with the West. They were biding their time, and when the corrupt Ottoman Empire finally collapsed, France was there to liberate them and to help them fulfill their manifest destiny. The Invisible City of Beirut then emerged from the mist as the prize the courageous Lebanese had so richly deserved. Now they were going to show the world what they were capable of. A lucky few peripheral areas were added to the new state, and they were expected to count their blessings and immediately follow the lead of their new brethrens. But at no time should they ever forget that the heart of Lebanon was beating in Bkerke.
The story is very compelling, and it is the one most of us learn in our schoolbooks. The problem is that it was totally irrelevant to the majority of the population of (Greater) Lebanon. In 1920, with the army of emir Faysal at the border, another historical narrative was emerging: one that places Lebanon firmly in the region, known as Arabism. Arabists tended to be concentrated on the coast. They did not see fundamental differences between the inhabitants of the mountain and the rest of the denizens of the Near East. They did not understand the Lebanist visceral attachment to the new colonial power, preferring to have close relationships with other Arab states. In time they would find a sacred cause: the Palestinian Revolution.
The history of modern Lebanon is one of conflicts and alliances between the Lebanists and the Arabists. Whenever they agreed to stop fighting, the birth, re-birth, and third coming of the country were announced: in 1943 with the National Pact, in 1989 with the Taef Agreement and on March 14 2005, with a massive demonstration. When they disagreed, internal strife quickly followed. Common wisdom dictated that for the country to be viable, both camps should join forces. Again, this is undoubtedly a very interesting story, but one with a huge problem: it just does not make sense as it ignores a wide number of Lebanese realities. And of course, it is also a very exclusionary narrative.
The problem with the Lebanist view is that it completely ignores not only the fragmentation of the country, but also the internal divisions of Mount Lebanon. Even at the most basic Maronite level, the area is divided in three separate zones who historically had fundamentally different experiences: the north was mostly ruled by clans, the center had a feudal structure with continuous tensions between the different social classes, while the south was dominated by non-Christian sects. When the Lebanese state collapsed in 1975, the three zones spent the next 15 years slaughtering each other: Ahrar (south) versus Kataeb (center), Kataeb (center) versus Marada (north), Hobeika (center) versus Geagea (north), Geagea (north) versus Aoun (center)... All the while Bkerke was bemoaning the "Christians" lack of unity.
For all intents of purpose, Arabism became obsolete in June of 1967 after the Egyptian strongman Jamal Abdel Nasser was humiliated by the Israelis. The whole ideology became an excuse for local dictators to persecute their population. Lebanese Arabists became pretty desperate, and had to up the ante in order to stay relevant so they basically agreed to give the country away to the "Palestinian Revolution". Eventually, given the catastrophic results of the strategy, a majority of Arabists would turn to a much more convenient champion, the Saudi petro-dollar, leaving behind a handful of disgruntled leftists.
Another problem has always been the lack of trust between Lebanists and Arabists. The former always claimed that if you were to scratch the patriotic veneer of the latter, their true colors would show. As a friend told me after March 14 2005: “these people have rediscovered Lebanon, but it will take more than a couple of months of waving the flag to convince us of their sincerity”. Over time, many formulas had been devised to solve the problem: neither East nor West, a bridge between the East and the West, a country with an Arab face...The journalist Georges Naccache summarized the problem in 1949 by stating that: “deux negations ne font pas une nation!”.
The Lebanist versus Arabist view does not even come close to explaining Lebanon's present problem as it only concerns about half of our population. The other half is completely missing from the story. A number of important events are either omitted or downplayed in our official Lebanese history, one of them being the violent popular uprisings of central Mount Lebanon in the first half of the XIXth century, known as 'Ammiyyat. These populists movements aimed to topple the traditional leadership of the area and to replace it by a new one issued from the masses. Michel Aoun and his Tayyar are the rightful heirs to the old revolts. Ascribing his movement to the blind presidential ambition of one man completely misses the point, and whether or not Lebanon will end up with a South American type of dictatorship is irrelevant. The fact is, that there is a large swath of the population that is ignored by our traditional chieftains, and with good reason since it is trying to have them replaced. It might seem shocking, but some individuals have a hard time accepting a pseudo-feudal leadership that is passed from incompetent father to usually even more incompetent son.
The Lebanist/Arabist narrative also totally ignores the fringes of the country. In all fairness, Akkar gets a couple of sentences in our official history: the "Lebanese" emir Fakhreddin went there to defeat Bani Sayfa, and took away the black stones of their houses to build his palace in Deir el Kamar. Hermel, the Bekaa and Jabal 'Amel are not so lucky. One would be hard-pressed to find any mention of them in the history of Lebanon: they are treated as non-entities. For the longest time it was not a problem as local traditional leaders such as Sabri Hamadeh and Kamel el Assaad were doing an excellent job controlling the locals. Things started to change in the early 70's under the impulse of Imam Musa el Sadr.
Having lived most of his life in Iran where the Shi'a are the dominant group, Musa el Sadr did not have any inferiority complex when it came to demanding more for his community from the Lebanese state. From now on, the Matlabiyya would not be presented piecemeal by the usual feudal chieftains, but much more vigorously by a well structured movement that did not reject the idea of Lebanon but was demanding its fair share of the national pie. This did not sit well with either the Arabists who had just given 'Amil to the Palestinians so they could turn it into Fatah Land, or with the gutless Lebanists who had approved the move for they did not realize that there were people actually living at the periphery of the country. As far as the two dominant groups were concerned, Imam Musa el Sadr was an Iranian agent sent by the Shah and financed by the Savak to destabilize the country. Either way, the genie was out of the bottle and it had no intention of going back in.
After the murder of Mr. Rafic Hariri, the Lebanists and the Arabists decided to give the old formula another try, so their traditional leaders formed the March 14 gathering. Except that this time, they were completely taken by surprise: the part of the population they had ignored for decades refused to play along, aggressively stating that the old arrangement would not be accepted this time around. In all fairness, both Lebanism and Arabism are grossly outdated at this point, and for Lebanon to survive a new formula that takes the whole population into account is needed. Instead, what we have today is one camp still busy ignoring the existence of half the population as if we are still in 1943, while the other is clumsily knocking at the door trying to fit in what is after all also their country. As for the political discourse, it is reaching surreal proportions with each faction accusing the foreign patrons of the other of wanting to destroy the country.
Some people will argue that history is irrelevant, that it is just a lame excuse used by those not patriotic enough, who refuse to adapt to the widely accepted paradigm. But in order to believe in Lebanon, you have to be part of it. Currently we have two well-defined camps who accuse one another of not being Lebanese enough. They are both wrong as no single movement has a monopoly on what being Lebanese really represents. In the end, we are all bound together in our country and we have no other choice than to try to understand each other. This requires efforts to open up and respect the other side's point of view, and to come up with a hundred reasons why March 14 should reach out to March 8 (and vice versa), instead of a hundred reasons why one is better than the other. What is also needed is the realization that the Old Lebanon that was an unstable compromise between Lebanists and Arabists died a long time ago. A new dynamic needs to start immediately if we still want to have a country. An essential first step is a historical narrative that is inclusive, as opposed to the shamefully exclusive one that we currently have. We don't need a new history of Lebanon, what we need is a history of the Lebanese People, all of them, from Bint Jbail to 'Andket, with arguments on the historical fine points to come later. Claiming that we are fighting for 10,452 km2, while imposing the history of only 3,500 km2 on the rest of the country, reeks of cultural colonialism.
Mustapha Mond.
Monday, March 05, 2007
Dream On.
There are at least 12 anti-war civil society movements in Lebanon. They have very tell tale names: Collectif de Citoyens Libanais et Amis du Liban (Pour Que le Liban Vive), Generation for Integrity of Lebanon (GIL), Hellouwa, Intizaret el Shabeb, Kafa (Violence and Exploitation), Leb-Youth, Loubnani wou Bass, Mada, Haraket el Mustakilloun, Nahnou, Nahwa el Muwatiniya, Peace Initiatives. They have recently joined forces in organizing the “Ou3a!” (“Wake U!”) anti-civil war campaign to “show that there is a manner to unite and work together for the development of our country.” They organized a rally on Saturday March 3 at the Bechara el Khoury intersection (which is a small plaza). I took my kids and went there. I wanted to be part of it.
There were less than 200 people. They were mostly between 20-30 years old, with very few graying adults. There were many foreigners, I would say 30 or so, and some reporters. No TV cameras. Security forces were deployed on a 1:1 basis. We booed politicians, left white handprints on a big black piece of fabric, listened distractedly to short unintelligible speeches (hand held loudspeakers didn’t help), had a casual chat with some acquaintances and went back home. It was all done in less than an hour. We did not even cause a traffic jam. I felt depressed and angry.
Is that all the crowd 12 peace movements can pull? Less than 15 people each? At this rate, these are not movements, merely gestures, and they would do well to fuse and organize as one movement. I realize that in the post-modern world, people want to cultivate their difference. I’m all for difference, but when you need massive popular action (and we certainly do in the anti-war movement in Lebanon), the problems posed by organizing so many groups and finding the common grounds must be tremendous. I really want to believe that Saturday’s meeting was only curtailed by logistics.
But there is something else. I did not check the socio-cultural preferences of all those present, but the crowd was really cool. Like chilling out. If March 14 was the Prada movement, this one was more like Fair Trade. These are the people who would go out of their way to buy organic, conserve the environment and buy from the small producers. They are nice people. But they are also marginal. With a hint of elitism. They should really find a way to make the rest of Lebanon identify with their ideals and their goals. Because as it stands, we may be cultivating the difference, but it is not going to grow very tall.
I had held great hopes for this rally. I had dreamt that the crowd will be gigantic and that it will peacefully encircle Martyr square, Riad el Solh, the Serail and the Parliament, and request an immediate Lebanese solution to the crisis. I also fantasized that people would refuse to go back to their houses, and that they would sit-in till the crisis ends, because they are really worried that there may be a bloody civil war, and that Lebanon will stop existing. This is not just simplistic, idealistic reverie. A mass mobilization for civil peace could provide a good way out for the government-opposition deadlock, amidst threats of civil disobedience and violent counterstrikes. It would also have given a clear, powerful signal to the high level Iranian-Saudi summit which was being held in Ryiad. And it would have defined a third force in Lebanon, a force that does not hold a double discourse, a force that truly loves life, not just that of its own sect.
I’ll dream on.
Abu Ali.
There were less than 200 people. They were mostly between 20-30 years old, with very few graying adults. There were many foreigners, I would say 30 or so, and some reporters. No TV cameras. Security forces were deployed on a 1:1 basis. We booed politicians, left white handprints on a big black piece of fabric, listened distractedly to short unintelligible speeches (hand held loudspeakers didn’t help), had a casual chat with some acquaintances and went back home. It was all done in less than an hour. We did not even cause a traffic jam. I felt depressed and angry.
Is that all the crowd 12 peace movements can pull? Less than 15 people each? At this rate, these are not movements, merely gestures, and they would do well to fuse and organize as one movement. I realize that in the post-modern world, people want to cultivate their difference. I’m all for difference, but when you need massive popular action (and we certainly do in the anti-war movement in Lebanon), the problems posed by organizing so many groups and finding the common grounds must be tremendous. I really want to believe that Saturday’s meeting was only curtailed by logistics.
But there is something else. I did not check the socio-cultural preferences of all those present, but the crowd was really cool. Like chilling out. If March 14 was the Prada movement, this one was more like Fair Trade. These are the people who would go out of their way to buy organic, conserve the environment and buy from the small producers. They are nice people. But they are also marginal. With a hint of elitism. They should really find a way to make the rest of Lebanon identify with their ideals and their goals. Because as it stands, we may be cultivating the difference, but it is not going to grow very tall.
I had held great hopes for this rally. I had dreamt that the crowd will be gigantic and that it will peacefully encircle Martyr square, Riad el Solh, the Serail and the Parliament, and request an immediate Lebanese solution to the crisis. I also fantasized that people would refuse to go back to their houses, and that they would sit-in till the crisis ends, because they are really worried that there may be a bloody civil war, and that Lebanon will stop existing. This is not just simplistic, idealistic reverie. A mass mobilization for civil peace could provide a good way out for the government-opposition deadlock, amidst threats of civil disobedience and violent counterstrikes. It would also have given a clear, powerful signal to the high level Iranian-Saudi summit which was being held in Ryiad. And it would have defined a third force in Lebanon, a force that does not hold a double discourse, a force that truly loves life, not just that of its own sect.
I’ll dream on.
Abu Ali.
Friday, March 02, 2007
The Labyrinth.
In a previous post on this blog, Abu Ali asserted that Lebanon is "going to civil war by popular demand", as most of us are supporting leaders that we know are hurling the country toward a new conflict. If we do not react quickly, we will only have ourselves to blame for the impending catastrophe. By and large I agree with his analysis, but it also seems that we have stacked the deck against ourselves in a way that makes it difficult for us to react rationally. Evidently, we have our freedom to choose, but the reality of our country only allows us to make bad choices.
In Lebanon the state is weak to non-existent and if a group of people chooses a bunch of ruthless warlords as their leaders, the rest of the population has only two choices: either do the same or leave the country and be good citizens somewhere else. If the central authority is unable or unwilling to do its job, and the village next door is ruled by a warlord, I am going to have a hard time electing an articulate and competent technocrat to represent me. It is a sad situation, but it is our current reality in Lebanon. Therefore, the majority of the population seems to be supporting unscrupulous individuals.
Lebanon is a fragmented country ruled by chieftains who will never ever solve any of our problems for the simple reason that if they do they will be out of a job. As long as the most basic rule of law is not applied, our depressing reality will not change.
The situation is reminiscent of feudal Europe before the birth of Nation States, with unruly warlords "protecting" their constituencies. In France, Louis XIV attempted to solve the problem by building a palace in Versailles and by having the nobility join him there. He then spent lavishly on them, overtaxing the population and running a huge debt as he went along. He basically bought the warlords and tried to incorporate them in his administration.
After the Taef Agreement, Rafic the First, founder of the Hariri dynasty did the same. He was able to convince a majority of the Lebanese warlords to stop fighting, and instead join his government where he took very good care of them making them all rich beyond their wildest dreams. With the assistance of his treasurer Mr. Fuad Saniora, our very own Colbert, he ran a debt of 45 billion dollars at the Lebanese people's expense and co-opted most of the war leaders. He did not succeed in creating a viable state, just an incredibly corrupt one. In the process he overlooked the poorest segment of the population, but then again, if they did not have bread they could eat cake instead.
At the other side of the spectrum, the popularity of Mr. Michel Aoun comes from the fact that he is the consummate outsider, and that he holds the vague promise of ridding the country of warlords once and for all. He is positioning himself as some kind of Lebanese Sun Yat-Sen. He might be mentally unstable as his opponents are fond of claiming and he might turn the country into a populist dictatorship similar to Hugo Chavez's Venezuela (minus the oil wealth), but for many people this is worth a try.
His movement even came up with a plan for the country. Granted, it seems to have been pieced together on the flight home from Paris as it is loaded with the usual platitudes and not particularly imaginative, but at least the Tayyar can pretend it is trying to come up with ideas. This is more than can be said for the other local players who seem to be fixated either on giving us back our dignity (assuming we have somehow lost it), or promising us a wealthy future (when we know that we are not the ones who will actually become wealthy). But then again, maybe this whole pseudo program is just a way to show something for 15 years of exile other than the fact that the General left the country in his pajamas but can back in his finest suit.
Lebanon today is a huge Labyrinth, and all of us are lost in it, especially those who pretend they are not because of their strong convictions. We are unable to reach the center, wandering aimlessly instead, trying to find our way. Some of us become discouraged and head for the exit never to return. Others get tired after a while and decide to just stay in the dead end they have reached, either ignoring or fighting people stuck in different dead ends.
In order to solve our numerous problems, we first need to map our national labyrinth. What does it really look like? How is our country structured, can we come up with an objective description of Lebanon? Second, we need to define the elusive center of the labyrinth. How do we see our country and what do we expect from it? Last but not least, we have to coax the wanderers and the dead-enders to follow the paths that will eventually lead them to the center.
The good news is that there are many Lebanese with the capacity to help us solve the riddle: Economists, urban planners, sociologists, historians, agronomists, lawyers, environmentalists... The bad news is that we are running out of time.
The Grateful Arab.
In Lebanon the state is weak to non-existent and if a group of people chooses a bunch of ruthless warlords as their leaders, the rest of the population has only two choices: either do the same or leave the country and be good citizens somewhere else. If the central authority is unable or unwilling to do its job, and the village next door is ruled by a warlord, I am going to have a hard time electing an articulate and competent technocrat to represent me. It is a sad situation, but it is our current reality in Lebanon. Therefore, the majority of the population seems to be supporting unscrupulous individuals.
Lebanon is a fragmented country ruled by chieftains who will never ever solve any of our problems for the simple reason that if they do they will be out of a job. As long as the most basic rule of law is not applied, our depressing reality will not change.
The situation is reminiscent of feudal Europe before the birth of Nation States, with unruly warlords "protecting" their constituencies. In France, Louis XIV attempted to solve the problem by building a palace in Versailles and by having the nobility join him there. He then spent lavishly on them, overtaxing the population and running a huge debt as he went along. He basically bought the warlords and tried to incorporate them in his administration.
After the Taef Agreement, Rafic the First, founder of the Hariri dynasty did the same. He was able to convince a majority of the Lebanese warlords to stop fighting, and instead join his government where he took very good care of them making them all rich beyond their wildest dreams. With the assistance of his treasurer Mr. Fuad Saniora, our very own Colbert, he ran a debt of 45 billion dollars at the Lebanese people's expense and co-opted most of the war leaders. He did not succeed in creating a viable state, just an incredibly corrupt one. In the process he overlooked the poorest segment of the population, but then again, if they did not have bread they could eat cake instead.
At the other side of the spectrum, the popularity of Mr. Michel Aoun comes from the fact that he is the consummate outsider, and that he holds the vague promise of ridding the country of warlords once and for all. He is positioning himself as some kind of Lebanese Sun Yat-Sen. He might be mentally unstable as his opponents are fond of claiming and he might turn the country into a populist dictatorship similar to Hugo Chavez's Venezuela (minus the oil wealth), but for many people this is worth a try.
His movement even came up with a plan for the country. Granted, it seems to have been pieced together on the flight home from Paris as it is loaded with the usual platitudes and not particularly imaginative, but at least the Tayyar can pretend it is trying to come up with ideas. This is more than can be said for the other local players who seem to be fixated either on giving us back our dignity (assuming we have somehow lost it), or promising us a wealthy future (when we know that we are not the ones who will actually become wealthy). But then again, maybe this whole pseudo program is just a way to show something for 15 years of exile other than the fact that the General left the country in his pajamas but can back in his finest suit.
Lebanon today is a huge Labyrinth, and all of us are lost in it, especially those who pretend they are not because of their strong convictions. We are unable to reach the center, wandering aimlessly instead, trying to find our way. Some of us become discouraged and head for the exit never to return. Others get tired after a while and decide to just stay in the dead end they have reached, either ignoring or fighting people stuck in different dead ends.
In order to solve our numerous problems, we first need to map our national labyrinth. What does it really look like? How is our country structured, can we come up with an objective description of Lebanon? Second, we need to define the elusive center of the labyrinth. How do we see our country and what do we expect from it? Last but not least, we have to coax the wanderers and the dead-enders to follow the paths that will eventually lead them to the center.
The good news is that there are many Lebanese with the capacity to help us solve the riddle: Economists, urban planners, sociologists, historians, agronomists, lawyers, environmentalists... The bad news is that we are running out of time.
The Grateful Arab.
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