by Edward S.Walker Jnr
The current rash of former US generals who are criticizing the leadership of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in Iraq was previewed 22 months ago by a number of former US ambassadors who also criticized our Iraq policy. It appears the administration does not welcome advice from experts or critics, both in and out of government, who do not agree with their predispositions, their ideology, and their prejudices. Will this be repeated with Iran?
This administration came into office in 2001 with two foreign policy issues on its agenda. At the first National Security Council meeting on the Middle East, which I attended, two subjects were front and center — Iraq and Iran. Iraq took priority in the planning cycle that followed but Iran was clearly on the table for future action. In the months leading up to our invasion, the State Department’s efforts to prepare for the day after in Iraq were ignored. Advisors to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney did not want to hear about potential problems.
In the period before the 2003 war, Paul O’Neill and Ken Dam, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, convened a meeting of experts on how to deal with the Iraq war’s aftermath. The overwhelming advice I heard in that meeting was to get Iraqis working again. Don’t engage in massive engineering projects with high price tags that serve American corporate interests but offer little employment benefit. Don’t jump the gun on programs, like privatization, that can lead to the short-term loss of jobs. Nobody at that meeting talked about dismantling the Iraqi Army because no one thought such a short-sighted move would be contemplated by anyone who had the slightest idea about Iraq or asymmetrical warfare. As we now know the advice of the experts was summarily dumped. Today we are seeing the administration dust off policies that were advocated and ignored before the war.
Is it conceivable that we will make the same mistakes all over again? Now we appear to be contemplating a war with Iran. The experts tell us we have time — a matter of years — before Iran can develop a nuclear weapon, if that is their intention.
This time we should ask ourselves some tough questions. Are we prepared for a protracted asymmetrical war with Iran of over the duration of ten years? When attacked by Iraq, Iran showed enormous staying power and unity against a better-armed enemy. Can the US really protect oil shipments through the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz We know from the USS Cole bombing in 2000 what a small boat on a suicide mission can do? Is the US prepared to protect our forces in Afghanistan and Iraq against Iranian-inspired attacks? Can we prevent a Shi’ite-led all-out civil war in Iraq or terrorist attacks against Israel by Iran’s ally Hezbollah? What about attacks in Africa and Latin America where terrorist cells by all accounts continue to survive? Or sleeper cells in Arab communities in Europe?
Can we counter the blitz of anti-American propaganda designed to increase recruiting for al-Qaeda and related terrorist organizations? Would the Gulf States be able to protect their oil facilities and our bases against Iranian-stimulated terrorists or direct special operations attacks? Can the US economy deal with a $100 plus price of a barrel of oil and long-term supply disruptions when our plans and worldwide crises reserves are based on short-term supply disruptions?
What if Iran is in it for the long haul? Saddam Hussein lasted for over 10 years under repeated US military attacks and draconian sanctions. Are the Iranians any less determined? Who will be our allies and how would we hold them together once we have unleashed Iran? And finally, have we based our plans on intelligence and advice from self-interested sources, as we did to large extent in Iraq, while ignoring the history and strong nationalism of the bulk of the Iranian people and their likely reaction to foreign attack? These are some of the questions the Administration needs to ask and to answer before deciding on a military solution.
There’s a lot of saber rattling these days against Iran. Saber rattling can be an effective diplomatic tool. But, to avoid another Iraq crisis, we still need a well-thought out strategy in case the diplomatic option fails.
Edward S. Walker, Jr. is President of the Middle East Institute. He previously served as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, US Ambassador to Israel, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, and Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations
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